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Abstract
Indivisible labour is not the only type of nonconvexity affecting labour supply decisions.
Another type of nonconvexity arises in economies with sectors whenever individuals can work
in only one sector at a time. I introduce this restriction into an open economy model with a
tradeable and a nontradeable sector, and I use lotteries to convexify the consumption possibilities
set. This approach implies that the aggregate elasticity of labour supply becomes infinite. I
compare the performance of the model with an analogous model in which the labour supply
elasticity is finite. I find that there is a disconnect between the response of wages to monetary
shocks and the open economy variables. The labour supply elasticity plays a more important
role in the transmission of technology and government expenditure shocks to the real exchange
rate and the terms of trade.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the performance of a two-country model with tradeable and nontradeable sectors
in which individuals cannot supply their labour services to both sectors at the same time. Account-
ing for the non-convexity arising from this restriction is important for two reasons. First, the data
show that most people do not or cannot hold two jobs at the same time.1 Secondly, macroecono-
mists have developed models with non-convexities which reconcile low individual labour supply
elasticities with the observed large fluctuations of aggregate hours over the business cycle. In my
model, the aggregate labour supply elasticity is infinite, as in a classic indivisible labour model. I
find that there is a “disconnect” between the open economy variables and the elasticity of labour
supply. Therefore the motivation of the paper is twofold: (1) to analyse one type of nonconvexity
which is relevant to open economy models with tradeable and nontradeable sectors; and (2) to
investigate the role played by the labour supply elasticity in open economy models.
This paper contributes to the literature by examining the implications of a non-standard as-
sumption regarding the allocation of hours worked between sectors. Many open economy models
have two sectors, one producing internationally traded goods and one producing nontradeable
goods, so they must also specify how individuals choose to allocate their labour time between the
two sectors. The standard assumption is that only the sum of hours worked enters the utility func-
tion. As a result, the representative agent is completely indifferent between, for example, working
20 hours a week in a tradeable sector firm plus 20 hours in a nontradeable sector firm, and working
40 hours a week in only one of the two firms. Instead, I consider an economy in which individual
choices are restricted, either work in one sector or the other, so the consumption possibilities set
is non-convex. This environment was first introduced by Rogerson (1988b). Like him, I assume
employment lotteries with complete markets and I show that the utility function features both the
intensive (hours) and the extensive (participation rates) margins of labour supply. However, these
preferences imply that all the adjustment in the labour supply occurs through the extensive, not
the intensive, margin, and the Frisch elasticity of the labour supply is infinite.
As it is well known, the observed large fluctuations in aggregate hours imply that the aggregate
labour supply elasticity must be large (Prescott 2005). Moreover, a large labour supply elasticity is
1 In 2013 the multiple jobholders as a percent of employed people in the US were just 4.9% (Source: Bureau of
Labor Statistics).
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important for monetary shocks to have persistent effects on output (Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan
2000). However, estimated elasticities from microeconometric studies are well below the calibrated
values in macroeconomic models. Seminal work by Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988a) showed
that these opposing facts can be reconciled by assuming that individual agents are only allowed
to make the choice as to whether to be employed or not, but cannot adjust the number of hours
worked. In this environment, the elasticity of the aggregate labour supply is infinite. Critics
of Rogerson’s aggregation consider it to be at odds with microeconomic observations, because it
relies on employment lotteries with complete markets. However, recently Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2005, 2011), and Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) have explored an alternative ‘time-averaging’
aggregation, according to which individuals face a {0, 1} employment choice in each period and
choose what fraction of their lifetime to work. So far, this debate has not influenced the open
economy literature, despite the fact that a special kind of labour indivisibility arises quite naturally
in economies with sectors (Rogerson 1988b).
Nevertheless, several contributions have uncovered a number of open economy results which
depend on the labour supply elasticity. Basu and Kollmann (2013) and Kollmann (2010) show
that a high labour supply elasticity is necessary to ensure that the real exchange rate depreciates
after an increase in government expenditure, consistently with the empirical evidence. Using a two-
sector dependent economy model, Morshed and Turnovsky (2011) show that the elasticity of labour
supply affects the speed of convergence of the real exchange rate to its long-run equilibrium value.
Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2007) analyse the reallocation of endogenous product varieties to the
most productive country following a shock. They find that this reallocation can be considerable,
but only if the labour supply elasticity is so high that relative wages are not affected by the
shock. In contrast to these contributions, I do not focus on a specific effect or statistics, but
instead I investigate the impact of the labour supply elasticity on the second-order moments of
several variables. I consider both demand (money and government expenditure) and supply-type
(productivity) shocks, and I show that the consequences of varying the labour supply elasticity are
dependent on the pricing assumption.
As in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), my model features monopolistic competition and price rigidity.
An important issue in this literature is the choice of currency of invoicing. This choice is important
because in a two-country, two-currency world it is possible to model price rigidity in different ways.
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One way, for example, is to assume that the law of one price holds and that prices are sticky in the
currency of the producer (producer currency pricing or PCP). This assumption is made, among
others, by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 2000, 2007), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Galí and Monacelli
(2005), and Benigno (2009). Another possibility is to assume that prices are sticky in the currency
of the destination market (local currency pricing or LCP). This assumption is made, for example, by
Betts and Devereux (1996, 2000), Kollmann (2001), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002), Benigno
and Thoenissen (2003), and Sutherland (2005). To date, the choice of pricing assumption and the
degree of exchange rate pass-through into import prices are still open questions in the literature,
therefore I check the robustness of the results to the choice of currency of invoicing.
Since the Frisch elasticity of labour supply cannot be calibrated freely, I compare the perfor-
mance of the infinite elasticity model with an analogous model in which individuals supply their
labour services to both sectors at the same time, and the labour supply elasticity is finite. I find
that the infinite labour supply elasticity dampens the response of wages and prices to monetary
shocks, but the decreased volatility of wages and prices has almost no effect on the volatility of the
terms of trade, and no effect at all on the volatility of real and nominal net exports. Therefore, there
is a disconnect between the open economy variables and the response of wages. Additionally, the
relationship between the speed of price adjustment (or the volatility of inflation) and the volatility
of the nominal exchange rate is weak. On the other hand, the Frisch elasticity of labour supply
plays an important role in the transmission of non-monetary shocks. The response of the terms of
trade and the real exchange rate to technology and government expenditure shocks is stronger if
the Frisch elasticity is relatively lower.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 illustrates the model, and Section 3 the
alternative assumption that individuals supply labour contemporaneously to both sectors. The
calibration of the model is described in Section 4. Sections 5, 6 and 7 explain the results, and
Section 8 concludes.
2 The model
The model includes features such as Calvo-style price rigidity, nontradeable goods and home bias
in consumption. The elasticity of exchange rate pass-through is a free parameter of the model,
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which nests both PCP and LCP as special cases. Throughout Sections 2 to 6 I assume PCP, and
I consider alternative pricing mechanisms in Section 7.
The world economy consists of two countries, Home and Foreign. Both countries have two
sectors, and in each sector there exists a continuum of monopolistic firms, each of them producing
a single differentiated product, or brand. The notation is as follows. The firms and the goods
they produce are indexed by fTH ∈ [0, 1] for the Home tradeable sector and fN ∈ [0, 1] for the
Home nontradeable sector. In the Foreign country, they are indexed by f∗TF ∈ [0, 1] and f∗N ∈ [0, 1]
respectively. All Foreign variables and indexes are denoted with stars. Prices of individual varieties
are denoted with lower cases, aggregate prices with upper cases. Steady state variables have a zero
time index.
Firms
Each firm has a fixed probability of changing its prices at date t. I follow the approach of Corsetti
and Pesenti (2005), and assume that the local currency prices of exports of Home and Foreign
tradeable varieties fTH and f∗TF are given, respectively, by:
p∗TH,t (fTH) =
epTH,t (fTH)
eζ
∗
t
, pTF,t (f∗TF ) = e
ζ
t ep∗TF,t (f∗TF ) , (1)
where e is the nominal exchange rate (price of the Foreign currency in terms of the Home currency),
ζ and ζ∗ are the pass-through elasticities into export prices, constant by assumption, and epTH (fTH)
and ep∗TF (f∗TF ) are predetermined components that are not adjusted to variations in the exchange
rate during period t. Thus, if both ζ and ζ∗ are equal to one the exchange rate pass-through is
complete, and if they are equal to zero the pass-through is zero.
Tradeable goods firms in both countries set two different prices, one for the Home market and
one for the Foreign market. For example, a Home tradeable sector firm fTH chooses the price
pTH,t (fTH) of domestic sales, and the predetermined component epTH,t (fTH) of the export price,
by maximising the present discounted value of profits:
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Et
∞X
j=0
(ϕβ)j Qt,t+j
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
pTH,t(fTH)
Pt+j
· yTH,t+j|t (fTH)
+et+j
p∗TH,t+j(fTH)
Pt+j
y∗TH,t+j|t (fTH)
−WTH,t+jPt+j · ehTH,t+j|t (fTH)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, (2)
subject to:
yTH,t+j|t (fTH) =
µ
pTH,t (fTH)
PTH,t+j
¶−η
CTH,t+j ,
y∗TH,t+j|t (fTH) =
Ã
p∗TH,t+j|t (fTH)
P ∗TH,t+j
!−η
C∗TH,t+j ,
p∗TH,t+j|t (fTH) = epTH,t (fTH) e−ζ∗t+j , (3)
where Qt,t+j =
u0(Ct+j)
u0(Ct) , β is the discount factor, and (ϕ)
j is the probability that pTH,t (fTH) andepTH,t (fTH) still apply at the future date t + j. The variables yTH,t+j|t (fTH) and y∗TH,t+j|t (fTH)
denote the Home and Foreign demands for good fTH , and ehTH,t+j|t (fTH) denotes the total labour
input used by the firm, if the prices decided at t still apply at date t+ j.
Output sold at Home and abroad is produced using a common plant or production function:
yTH,t (fTH) + y∗TH,t (fTH) = zTH,t · ehTH,t (fTH)α , (4)
where the parameter α allows for decreasing returns to labour, and zTH represents technology.
In the Foreign country, the production function and maximization problem of tradeable sector
firms f∗TF are the same as in the Home country. All parameters are assumed to be the same in
both countries and sectors. In particular, I assume that both ζ∗ and ζ (the pass-through elasticity
into import prices) are equal to one.
The pricing behaviour and production functions of nontradeable sector firms fN and f∗N are as
described in this section, except for the fact that nontradeable firms serve only their own domestic
market and do not engage in price discrimination.
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Consumption indexes
Preferences over tradeable and nontradeable goods in the Home country are specified as follows:2
Ct =
h
(1− γ)
1
φ (CT,t)
φ−1
φ + γ
1
φ (CN,t)
φ−1
φ
i φ
φ−1
, (5)
while preferences over Home and Foreign tradeables are given by:
CT,t =
h
(1− δ)
1
θ (CTH,t)
θ−1
θ + δ
1
θ (CTF,t)
θ−1
θ
i θ
θ−1 . (6)
The preference weights γ and δ and the substitution elasticities φ and θ are the same in both
countries.
The consumption sub-indices for the individual varieties are given by CES aggregators, with
constant elasticity of substitution η. Price indexes are defined as the minimal expenditures needed
to buy one unit of the corresponding consumption aggregators.
Government budget constraint and money supply
According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2014), government consumption expenditures
consists of services provided to the public without charge. Therefore I assume that the Home and
Foreign governments purchase only nontradeable goods produced in their own country. The budget
constraint of the Home government at date t is given by:3
Mt −Mt−1 = PN,tGt + TRt , (7)
where M is money, PN is the aggregate price of nontradeables, G is a CES aggregator of varieties
fN , with the same elasticity of substitution η, and TR are government transfers.
Individual preferences and labour supply
The Home and Foreign countries are populated by a continuum of homogeneous individuals uni-
formly distributed on [0, 1]. I discuss only the Home maximisation problem, since it is the same
2Preferences in the Foreign country are described by the same aggregators.
3The Foreign government budget constraint and the public expenditure aggregator are entirely analogous.
7
in both countries. In each period the individual chooses consumption, real money balances MP and
hours worked in each sector. Real money balances are included in the utility function because of
the liquidity services that they provide. Let hTH and hN denote total hours supplied to all firms in
sectors TH and N . Total time available to an employed individual is normalized to one, and total
time available to an unemployed individual is denoted with τ . An individual who works incurs a
fixed participation or commuting cost ψ, measured in units of time. Because of the restriction that
labour cannot be supplied to both sectors simultaneously, the individual’s consumption possibilities
set X in any given period is nonconvex:
X =
½µ
C,
M
P
, hTH , hN
¶
: C ≥ 0, M
P
≥ 0, 0 ≤ hTH ≤ 1− ψ, 0 ≤ hN ≤ 1− ψ, hTH · hN = 0
¾
.
The individual’s utility function4 is:
U0 = E0
X∞
t=0
βt
"
C1−σt − 1
1− σ +
χ
1− ε
µ
Mt
Pt
¶1−ε
+ υ (hTH,t, hN,t)
#
, (8)
where σ and ε are curvature parameters, and:
υ (hTH,t, hN,t) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
κ
ω (1− ψ − hTH,t)
ω if hTH,t 6= 0 ,
κ
ω (1− ψ − hN,t)
ω if hN,t 6= 0 ,
κ
ω (τ)
ω if hTH,t = hN,t = 0 .
The parameters κ, ψ and ω can be chosen so as to match the labour supply elasticity and hours
worked in the steady state.
The consumption set can be convexified by adding lotteries over the choice of working in the
two sectors. In this environment the individual maximises her expected utility,5 which is given by:
4 I choose these functional forms because Rogerson’s (1988b) aggregation requires separable preferences, and be-
cause analogous functional forms (but not the nonconvexity) can be found in the literature; for example, Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1995) or Benigno and Thoenissen (2003).
5Notice that these preferences are the same as those of a utilitarian household with a unit mass of homogeneous
individuals, who assigns a fraction of its members to sector TH and another fraction to sector N , pools its members’
labour incomes and ensures that each one receives the same level of consumption.
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U0 = E0
X∞
t=0
βt
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
C1−σt −1
1−σ +
χ
1−ε
³
Mt
Pt
´1−ε
+ nTH,t · κω (1− ψ − hTH,t)ω
+nN,t · κω (1− ψ − hN,t)ω
+(1− nTH,t − nN,t) · κω (τ)ω
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, (9)
where nTH and nN are the probabilities of working in the tradeable and nontradeable sectors.
Because of the law of large numbers, these are equal to the fractions of individuals at the aggregate
level.
The aggregation based on employment lotteries has attracted some objections (Ljungqvist and
Sargent 2011), but on the other hand the utility function (9) possesses several advantages. First, it
disentangles both margins of labour supply, hours and participation rates. Second, since the prob-
abilities enter linearly, it can be interpreted as average or expected utility. Third, this specification
does not impose that sectors pay the same wage.6
Individuals can smooth their consumption by trading in a one-period non-contingent real bond,
denominated in units of the Home tradeable goods consumption index, sold at the price PT . Simi-
larly to Benigno (2001), individuals must pay a small cost in order to undertake a position in the
international asset market.7 This cost is assumed to be a payment in exchange for intermediation
services, offered by financial firms located in both the Home and the Foreign country. Individuals
pay this cost only to firms located in their own country.
The period-t budget constraint of the individual in the Home country is as follows:
BtPT,t +
ν
C0
B2t PT,t +Mt ≤ (1 + rt−1)Bt−1PT,t +Mt−1
+TRt − PtCt + nTH,tWTH,thTH,t + nN,tWN,thN,t
+
Z 1
0
ΠTH,t (fTH) dfTH +
Z 1
0
ΠN,t (fN) dfN +Rt , (10)
6 In a separate appendix (available on request) I present a two-sector open economy version of Hansen (1985) and
Rogerson (1988a), in which individuals can either work a fixed workweek or not at all, and I show that the solution
is analogous to the model in which labor cannot be supplied to both sectors simultaneously. Thus, the restriction
that individuals can only work in one sector at a time may be seen as an alternative way of generating the same
quantitative results as indivisible labor, but without the assumption of a fixed workweek length.
7This assumption ensures stationarity of the model and a well-defined steady state, as demonstrated by Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2003).
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where B is the internationally traded bond, νC0B is the cost of holding one unit of the bond,
8 which
depends on the positive parameter ν, r is the real interest rate, TR are government transfers,
WTH and WN are the nominal wages paid in the tradeable and nontradeable sector respectively,
ΠTH (fTH) and ΠN (fN ) are the profits that the individual receives from firms fTH (tradeable
sector) and fN (nontradeable sector), and R represents the rents generated by the financial inter-
mediaries. The internationally traded bond B is in zero net supply worldwide. Nominal wages are
flexible.
When both participation rates and hours of work are choice variables the assumption that
preferences are separable has important consequences. By combining a few first order conditions
of the maximization problem we obtain:
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hTH,t)ω + κ (1− ψ − hTH,t)ω−1 hTH,t =
κ
ω
(τ)ω , (11)
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hN,t)ω + κ (1− ψ − hN,t)ω−1 hN,t =
κ
ω
(τ)ω . (12)
Equations (11) and (12) above must have a unique solution, but the solution must be the same
in the steady state and in each date t. Therefore, in this model hours worked in the two sectors are
always constant and equal to each other.9 This result in turn implies that the first order conditions
with respect to the labour effort reduce to only one equation:
κ (1− ψ − h0)ω−1Cσt =
WTH,t
Pt
=
WN,t
Pt
, (13)
where h0 is endogenously constant. Notice that in Hansen’s (1985) model h0 is exogenously
given instead. Real wages are equalized between sectors, and in this model output demand de-
termines the amount of the labour input. The aggregate labour supply,10 i.e. the supply of
8 If we denote with Ψ (B)B the cost of holding bonds, then the function Ψ must be nonconcave, increasing and
continuously differentiable. An additional requirement is that Ψ (B) = 0 if and only if B = 0, and Ψ0 (B) 6= 0.
9 It is possible to ensure that hours worked in the two sectors are different by specifying a different participation
cost ψ in the two sectors.
10The Frisch elasticity is derived from the first-order conditions for labour effort, holding the marginal utility of
wealth constant. From equation (13) we obtain
ϑWtPt
ϑnt
= 0, therefore the aggregate Frisch elasticity ϑ(h0nt)
ϑWtPt
·
Wt
Pt
(h0nt)
is
infinite.
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h0nt ≡ h0 (nTH,t + nN,t), is infinitely elastic,11 as is the supply of nTH,t and nN,t.
3 If labour is supplied to both sectors simultaneously
The standard assumption in the literature is that individuals can work contemporaneously in both
the tradeable and nontradeable sectors. For comparability purposes I keep the same functional
forms in both scenarios. The utility function and budget constraint are as follows:
U0 = E0
X∞
t=0
βt
"
C1−σt − 1
1− σ +
χ
1− ε
µ
Mt
Pt
¶1−ε
+
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hTH,t − hN,t)ω
#
, (14)
BtPT,t +
ν
C0
B2t PT,t +Mt ≤ (1 + rt−1)Bt−1PT,t +Mt−1
+TRt − PtCt +Wt (hTH,t + hN,t)
+
Z 1
0
ΠTH,t (fTH) dfTH +
Z 1
0
ΠN,t (fN) dfN +Rt . (15)
Since hours worked enter additively, the individual is indifferent between working in one sector
or both, provided the aggregate labour supply ht ≡ hTH,t + hN,t is the same. Notice that in an
interior solution sectors must pay the same wage.
It may be possible to interpret (14) as the utility function of a stand-in household, whose hours
of work equal aggregate hours in the economy. There are however some unresolved issues with
this interpretation. The utility function (14) does not distinguish between the intensive and the
extensive margins of labour supply, however, if hTH,t and hN,t are to be interpreted as aggregate
hours, they must be the outcome of choices made on both margins. If, for example, we regard
the hours in (14) as the product of participation rates times hours worked per person, then this
specification is neither the average nor the expected utility of the members of the household. More
generally, it is not possible to see how the intensive and extensive margins determine the aggregate
11 In a separate appendix I investigate whether the infinite elasticity is due to the employment lottery or the
homogeneity of individuals. I show that heterogeneity per se does not guarantee a finite elasticity of labour supply,
and what matters in a model with this type of non-convexity is how the aggregate variables are derived from the
preferences of heterogeneous individuals. In a utilitarian household solution it is possible to have a finite labour
supply elasticity if individuals are heterogeneous. In the equilibrium with employment lotteries the elasticity of
labour supply is infinite, even with agent heterogeneity.
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hours in (14) without a formal derivation of the utility of the stand-in household from individual
preferences.
To examine the implications of (14) for the labour supply elasticity, consider the first order
condition with respect to the labour effort:
κ (1− ψ − ht)ω−1Cσt =
Wt
Pt
. (16)
from which we obtain the Frisch labor supply elasticity: ϑht
ϑWtPt
·
Wt
Pt
ht
= 11−ω
1−ψ−ht
ht
. Since h0 is given
in the steady state, the Frisch elasticity can be calibrated with the parameter ω. Therefore if ω < 1
the labour supply is upward sloping.12 Firms decide how aggregate hours worked are allocated
between the two sectors.
4 Calibration
The calibrated parameter values are shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1 HERE
The parameter σ is the same as in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002). Given σ, I choose 
so that the consumption elasticity of money demand is equal to one, and I choose κ and ψ so that
hours worked in the steady state are equal to 324.8/1369 in both models.13
The elasticity of substitution between tradeable and nontradeable goods is as in Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2005). I choose a value for the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
tradeables that is somehow in the middle of the range of values in the literature. The preference
weight for nontradeables γ is set between the values suggested by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2007) and
Benigno and Thoenissen (2003), and the parametrization of δ, the preference weight for Foreign-
produced tradeables, is as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005).14 I calibrate the steady state ratios of
exogenous technology so that, in both models, the ratio of Home to Foreign tradeable output is
12Once the Frisch elasticity is chosen, the actual values of κ and ψ are irrelevant to the dynamics of the log-linearized
model.
13These numbers are average hours worked in a year and total hours available, taken from Burnside and Eichenbaum
(1996).
14The calibrated value for δ implies that the share of imports over aggregate output is 5%, which is roughly the
share of the combined imports from Canada, Japan, Mexico, France, Germany and the UK over U.S. GDP.
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equal to one, and the Home and Foreign ratios of tradeable to nontradeable output15 are equal to
0.2. Consequently the steady state is the same in both models.
The intermediation cost parameter ν is chosen so that the spread in the nominal interest rates
approximates the value suggested by Benigno (2009). The parameter η implies that the steady
state markup is about 1.15, and the probabilities of not changing prices imply an average price
duration of about one year. The elasticity of output with respect to hours is calibrated so that,
given the mark-up, in the steady state the share of wages in output is equal to 0.7. I assume PCP
but I consider alternative pricing assumptions in Section 7.
I compute the time series of technology, money growth and government expenditures for the
U.S. and the rest of the world. The rest of the world is an aggregate of Canada, France, Germany,16
Japan, Mexico and the UK, which together represented 46% of the U.S. total trade in goods in
2007.17 The combined GDP of these six countries was 104% of the U.S. GDP in the last quarter
of 2007. I compute the tradeable and nontradeable technology series using sectoral data.
Shock properties are estimated by fitting AR(1) processes to the money growth rates and the
logs of technology and government expenditures (all HP-filtered).18 Several of the estimated cross-
correlations among the shocks are lower than 0.15 and non-statistically significant, therefore I
parameterize them at zero. All the cross-correlations which are instead statistically significant are
shown in Table 1, together with all the other estimated shock properties.
I solve the model numerically using Uhlig’s “Toolkit” algorithm (1999). The numerical solution
is obtained by log-linearising the equations around a deterministic equilibrium or steady state. I
assume that in the steady state bond holdings are zero.
5 Results
I illustrate the performance of the model of Section 2 against the data and against the standard
assumption that individuals supply labour contemporaneously to both sectors, in which case I
15The ratio of value added in manufacturing over the value added in services is approximately equal to 0.2 in the
U.S.. Source: own calculations based on the Groningen 60-Industry Database, http://www.ggdc.net.
16East Germany is not included in the time series up until 1990:4.
17Author’s calculations based on Bureau of Economic Analysis data. China has recently emerged as another top
US trading partner, but it was not included in the aggregate of Foreign countries because of the limited availability
of data on the Chinese economy.
18Details on the construction of the exogenous processes are given in a separate appendix (available on request).
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assume that preferences are as in Section 3 and so the labour supply elasticity is finite. I consider
two alternative values for the Frisch elasticity19, 1.5 and 0.75, and I report second-order moments20
of the finite and the infinite elasticity models in Table 2.
TABLE 2 HERE
A critical issue to consider beforehand is the measurement of the aggregate labour input. In
the model of Section 2, all variation in the labour input is represented by variation in the extensive
margin, or changes in participation rates, so I measure the aggregate labour input with nt. On
the other hand, if individuals supply labour contemporaneously to both sectors and preferences
are as in Section 3, all variation in the labour input is represented by variation in the intensive
margin, or changes in hours, so the aggregate labour input is ht. I choose to measure the aggregate
labour input in the data with aggregate hours, which are the product of average weekly hours and
employment, and therefore reflect changes along both margins.21
The other variables of interest are real aggregate output, which is defined as Yt ≡ PTH,0YTH,t+
P ∗TH,0Y
∗
TH,t+PN,0YN,t, while total tradeable output is Y
Tot
TH,t ≡ YTH,t+Y ∗TH,t = CTH,t+C∗TH,t. The
price index for all Home tradeable goods is defined as the weighted average of the prices paid by
domestic and foreign consumers, with weights taken from the steady state:
PTotTH,t ≡
PTH,t · YTH0 + etP ∗TH,t · Y ∗TH0
PTH0 · YTH0 + e0P ∗TH0 · Y ∗TH0
. (17)
The real exchange rate is the ratio of Foreign to Home aggregate price indexes:
RERt ≡
etP ∗t
Pt
. (18)
19These are steady state values. I choose these two values because most estimates in the macro literature lie in this
range. Raffo (2008) reports that the range of estimates for the Frisch elasticity of labour supply is between 1 and 1.5
at the aggregate level. Based on their survey of the literature, Chetty et al. (2011) recommend calibrating macro
models to match a Frisch elasticity of aggregate hours of 0.75. On the other hand, some authors in the literature
assume that the disutility from labour is linear, so the Frisch labour supply elasticity is infinite (for example, Cooke
2010).
20The statistics of Tables 2-5 were obtained using frequency domain techniques as described in Uhlig (1999). The
number of gridpoints used in the computation of the spectral density is 512. Increasing the number of gridpoints has
no significant effect on the model moments up to the second decimal place.
21This choice is consistent with many studies, including the indivisible labour literature. For example, Hansen
(1985) considers total hours (i.e. aggregate) for persons at work in non-agricultural industries. However, other
studies measure ht with employment data (for example, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan 2002).
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An increase (fall) in this quantity is a “depreciation” (“appreciation”). The (Home) terms of
trade is the relative price of imports over exports:
Tt ≡
PTF,t
etP ∗TH,t
. (19)
I consider two measures of net exports: the ratio of nominal net exports to nominal GDP:
NXt ≡
etP ∗TH,tY
∗
TH,t − PTF,tYTF,t
PTH,tYTH,t + etP ∗TH,tY
∗
TH,t + PN,tYN,t
, (20)
and the ratio of real net exports to real GDP:
NXQTYt ≡
P ∗TH,0Y
∗
TH,t − PTF,0YTF,t
PTH,0YTH,t + P ∗TH,0Y
∗
TH,t + PN,0YN,t
. (21)
Changes in NXt are determined by changes in quantities (exports and imports of goods),
and changes in relative prices (the terms of trade and the relative price of nontradeables), while
NXQTYt is unaffected by the changes in relative prices.
Given the focus of this paper on the tradeable and nontradeable sectors, I also report sectoral
statistics22 in Table 2. In the data, the tradeable sector is represented by manufacturing, and the
nontradeable sector by services.23 The Frisch elasticity does not affect the sectoral statistics: the
second-order moments generated by the infinite elasticity model are very close to the ones obtained
with a finite Frisch elasticity.24 Moreover, both the infinite and the finite elasticity models are able
to generate more volatile employment and output in the tradeable sector than in the nontradeable
sector.25
Table 2 shows that the Frisch elasticity has a significant impact on the volatility of wages and
inflation rates (or prices). To understand why, it may be useful to examine, by means of a variance
decomposition exercise, which shocks are the main sources of business cycle fluctuations.
22The sectoral statistics presented in Table 2 differ from the ones in Devereux and Hnatkovska (2012). This is
because they report the properties of sectoral shares, while I compute the statistics using sectoral output levels.
23Notice that, since some manufacturing output is nontradeable, and some services are actually traded internation-
ally, the data is an imprecise measure of tradeable and nontradeable output.
24The standard deviation of average weekly hours of production workers relative to output in the US is 0.29 (source:
own calculations based upon BLS data).
25 In Povoledo (2013) I compare the data at different frequencies and sectoral classifications, and I show that
tradeable sector variables are always more volatile than nontradeable sector variables.
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TABLE 3 HERE
As shown in Table 3, the sum of Home and Foreign money shocks explains the largest propor-
tion of the variance of all variables. The impact of technology shocks on sectoral employment is
significant, and yet lower than the combined impact of Home and Foreign money shocks. Therefore
monetary shocks are the main cause of business cycle fluctuations.
To understand why the Frisch elasticity affects the volatility of wages (Table 2), we can focus
only on monetary shocks, as these explain more than 80% of their variance. The larger is the labour
supply elasticity and the flatter is the labour supply curve, so real wages respond less after a shock
affecting the labour demand. This fact is confirmed by Table 2: the standard deviation of wages
relative to output falls when the Frisch elasticity is higher.26 However, since wages affect marginal
costs, the lower is the response of wages, and the lower is the response of prices after a shock,
because firms optimally choose not to raise their prices much if wages do not rise much. Therefore,
the higher is the Frisch elasticity, the less responsive are prices.
On the other hand, the labour supply elasticity has almost no effect on the volatility of the
open economy variables. For example, if the Frisch elasticity increases from 0.75 to infinity, the
volatility of real wages decreases by 32% (from 4.13 to 2.79), and the volatility of inflation decreases
by 16% (from 0.76 to 0.64),27 but the decreased volatility of wages and prices has almost no effect
on the volatility of the terms of trade, and no effect at all on the volatility of real (NXQTY ) and
nominal net exports (NX). The nominal exchange rate is affected, but its volatility decreases only
by 6% (from 4.30 to 4.06). Therefore, there is a disconnect between the open economy variables
and the response of wages. Moreover, the relationship between the speed of price adjustment (or
the volatility of inflation) and the volatility of the nominal exchange rate is weak.
We can further understand the results of Table 2 by inspecting the impulse responses of the
open economy variables to Home monetary shocks (Figure 1). I do not present the responses to
Foreign shocks since they are qualitatively symmetrical to the responses to Home shocks.28
26On the other hand, when the Frisch elasticity increases, the increased volatility of employment is matched by an
increase in the volatility of output, thus the standard deviation of employment relative to output is almost unaffected.
27The decrease in the volatility of tradeable goods inflation πTotTH and aggregate inflation π may partially be due to
the change in the volatility of the nominal exchange rate. However, nontradeable goods inflation πN is not directly
affected by changes in the exchange rate, and its volatility decreases by 19% (from 0.62 to 0.51).
28They are not perfectly symmetrical because the estimated AR parameters of the shocks are not identical. However,
since the Home and Foreign countries share the same structural parameters, such departures from perfect symmetry
are not significant. The responses of all the other variables to the shocks are available on request.
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FIGURE 1 HERE
A positive shock to the Home money growth rate causes a nominal depreciation of the Home
currency and an increase in Home prices. Because of price rigidity, the response of the nominal
exchange rate is stronger than the increase of Home prices, therefore a positive Home money
shocks brings about a depreciation (increase) of both the real exchange rate and the terms of trade
(Figure 1). Moreover, because of the expenditure-switching effect which characterizes PCP models
(the terms of trade depreciation causes the foreign and domestic demand to shift towards Home
tradeable goods), a positive Home monetary shock causes an increase in real net exports.
However, the increase of Home prices dampens the effect of the nominal depreciation on the
real exchange rate and on the terms of trade. Therefore, after an increase in the speed of price
adjustment, we would expect the response of the real exchange rate and the terms of trade to the
monetary shocks to be comparatively smaller and less persistent. One strategy for controlling the
speed of price adjustment is to vary the Frisch elasticity of labour supply, which becomes infinite
when there are nonconvexities affecting the labour supply. Figure 1 shows that this strategy is
ineffective: the Frisch elasticity of labour supply almost has no effect on the impulse responses
of the open economy variables to monetary shocks, which are the main source of business cycle
fluctuations.
I also plot the autocorrelation functions of the open economy variables in Figure 2. The auto-
correlation functions of the real and nominal exchange rates generated by the final and the infinite
elasticity models match reasonably well their empirical counterparts, while the empirical autocor-
relations of real net exports and the terms of trade do not die out as fast as the model-generated
autocorrelations. But the persistence of the open economy variables cannot be increased by the
infinite labour supply elasticity, since it has almost no effect on the autocorrelation at all lags.
FIGURE 2 HERE
To understand why there is a disconnect between the open economy variables and the response
of wages (or, between the open economy variables and the elasticity of labour supply), it is useful
to derive an expression for the nominal exchange rate under a few simplifying assumptions. From
the log-linearized first-order conditions for bond and money holdings in the Home and Foreign
countries we can derive the following expressions:
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σ
³
Et bCt+1 −Et bC∗t+1´ = σ ³ bCt − bC∗t ´+Etbet+1 − bet + ³ bPt − bP ∗t ´− ³Et bPt+1 −Et bP ∗t+1´ , (22)
ε
³cMt − cM∗t ´− ε³ bPt − bP ∗t ´ = 11− β
⎡
⎢⎣
σ
³ bCt − bC∗t ´− σβ ³Et bCt+1 −Et bC∗t+1´
+β
³ bPt − bP ∗t ´− β ³Et bPt+1 −Et bP ∗t+1´
⎤
⎥⎦ . (23)
By substituting (22) into (23) and assuming for simplicity σ = ε = 1 we obtain:
³cMt − cM∗t ´− ³ bPt − bP ∗t ´ = ³ bCt − bC∗t ´+ β1− β (bet −Etbet+1) . (24)
If ζ = ζ∗ = 1 and countries are symmetric, then:
bPt − bP ∗t = k2bet − k2 (1− 2δ)³ bPTF,t − bPTH,t´+ (1− k2)³ bPN,t − bP ∗N,t´ , (25)
where k2 ≡ (PT0CT0) / (P0C0) is the steady state ratio of tradeable consumption over total con-
sumption. By substituting (25) into equation (24) and solving forward we obtain:
bet = 1k2
⎡
⎢⎣
k2 (1− 2δ)
³ bPTF,t − bPTH,t´− (1− k2)³ bPN,t − bP ∗N,t´
−
³ bCt − bC∗t ´+ (1− β)EtP∞j=0 βj ³cMt+j − cM∗t+j´
⎤
⎥⎦ . (26)
Equation (26) above illustrates why the labour supply elasticity does not significantly affect
the nominal exchange rate. It shows that the response of the nominal exchange rate depends on
the current and expected future nominal money supply in the two countries, and on the current
consumption and nontradeable goods price differentials. Since the labour supply elasticity has a
modest impact on the response of current period consumption, it can affect only Equation (26)
through the response of nontradeable good prices. However, only the contemporaneous response of
nontradeable good prices affects Equation (26), therefore, increasing the amount of price adjustment
by means of the Frisch elasticity has a limited impact on Equation (26). This is because the future
path of prices, which depends on the labour supply elasticity, does not enter Equation (26).
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Equations (18) and (19) show why the labour supply elasticity does not significantly affect the
real exchange rate and the terms of trade. Given that the response of the nominal exchange rate to
monetary shocks is not affected by the Frisch elasticity, the labour supply elasticity can affect only
equations (18) and (19) through the response of relative prices. However, an increase or decrease in
the amount of price adjustment not only affects the response of Home prices to monetary shocks,
but also the response of Foreign prices, therefore an increase in the response of the denominator
is offset by a similar increase in the response of the numerator (and vice versa). As a result, the
Frisch elasticity has a modest impact on the response of international relative prices. Finally, since
the Frisch elasticity does not significantly affect the nominal exchange rate and the terms of trade,
it does not affect significantly real and nominal net exports.
6 The responses to technology and government expenditure shocks
The responses of the open economy variables to technology and government expenditure shocks are
far smaller in magnitude than the responses to monetary shocks (Figures 3 to 5). Moreover, the
estimated volatility of technology and government shocks is lower than the volatility of monetary
shocks (Table 1). Therefore, the contribution of technology and government shocks to the variance
of the open economy variables is far smaller than the contribution of monetary shocks (Table 3).
On the other hand, the Frisch elasticity of labour supply affects the responses to technology and
government shocks more than it affects the responses to monetary shocks.
FIGURES 3-5 HERE
Looking at Figures 3 to 5, we can notice that the response of the nominal exchange rate to
technology and government expenditure shocks is generally more muted than the responses of the
real exchange rate and the terms of trade. This implies that technology and government expenditure
shocks affect the real exchange rate and the terms of trade primarily through their impact on relative
prices, not much through the nominal exchange rate. Therefore, since the Frisch elasticity affects
the speed of price adjustment, it plays an important role in the transmission of technology and
government expenditure shocks to the real exchange rate and the terms of trade.
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Consider first a positive Home tradeable technology shock, which causes a decrease in the
demand for labour, and consequently a fall in the Home wage rate and a decrease in the price of
Home tradeable goods. Since the price of Home exports falls, the terms of trade increases in both
the finite and the infinite elasticity models (Figure 3). However, if the labour supply is very elastic,
the fall in wages is relatively modest. Therefore, the more elastic is the labour supply, and the
smaller is the fall in Home marginal cost and tradeable goods prices. As a result, the terms of trade
increases less in the infinite elasticity model because the price of Home exports (the denominator
of Equation 19) falls less. Moreover, as demand switches towards the cheaper Home tradeables, the
prices of the other Home goods fall as well. The indirect effect of technology shocks on the other
goods’ prices is controlled by the Frisch elasticity. In the infinite elasticity model the prices of the
other Home goods decrease less, thus the real exchange rate increases less (Figure 3).
Consider now a positive Home nontradeable technology shock, which causes a decrease of the
price of Home nontradeable goods. Since nontradeables constitute the largest share of Home con-
sumption, the Home aggregate price index decreases, consequently the real exchange rate increases,
but more so in the finite elasticity model (Figure 4), because of the faster speed of price adjustment.
Moreover, as demand shifts towards the cheaper nontradeables, Home tradeable output falls, con-
sequently the marginal cost of producing tradeables falls. Home tradeable goods producers lower
their prices, including the price of Home exports, therefore the terms of trade is also affected by
the nontradeable technology shock (Figure 4). The terms of trade increase is strong in the finite
elasticity model because the speed of adjustment of tradeable goods prices is faster. On the other
hand, price effects are more muted in the infinite elasticity model, so the response of the terms of
trade is closer to the response of the nominal exchange rate.
Finally, after a positive government expenditure shock the price of Home nontradeables increases
(because the government buys more of them), and the prices of all the other Home goods increase
(because Home consumers substitute away from nontradeables). As a result, both the real exchange
rate and the terms of trade decrease, more so in the finite elasticity model (Figure 5).
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7 Robustness
In this Section I consider how the pricing assumption affects the second-order moments of the
model. I consider two alternative pricing assumptions: (1) LCP in both countries; and (2) an
asymmetric scenario in which Home producers use PCP and Foreign producers use LCP when
selling their goods to the other country. I focus only on the major changes in the second-order
moments.
TABLES 4 and 5 HERE
Under LCP the Frisch elasticity significantly affects the volatility of wages and inflation rates,
but it has a modest impact on the open economy variables (Table 4). Therefore, there is a disconnect
between the response of wages and the volatility of the open economy variables in both the LCP
and the PCP scenarios.
It is possible to understand the link between price adjustment and the nominal exchange rate by
examining the model equations under LCP. If ζ = ζ∗ = 0, the log-linearised optimality conditions
of tradeable sector firms imply:
bet = bPTH,t − bP ∗TH,t + 11− ϕβ ϕ1− ϕ £πTH,t − π∗TH,t − βEtπTH,t+1 + βEtπ∗TH,t+1¤ , (27)
where πTH and π∗TH denote respectively the growth rates of PTH (the price paid by Home con-
sumers) and P ∗TH (the price paid by Foreign consumers).
29 Equation (27) shows that there is a
causal relationship between price adjustment at date t and the nominal exchange rate. However,
the future path of prices has a limited impact on today’s exchange rate, because current and future
inflation rates enter Equation (27) with opposite sign.
Neither PCP nor LCP explain the evidence on exchange rate pass-through, but there is no
consensus yet on the correct pricing assumption. Using micro data on import and export prices,
recently Gopinath and Rigobon (2008), and Gopinath, Itskhoki and Rigobon (2010) have shown
that for the United States there is PCP in exports and LCP in imports. Therefore, I also consider
an asymmetric scenario with ζ∗ = 1 and ζ = 0 and present the results in Table 5.
29Under LCP, the price paid by Foreign consumers is not directly affected by the nominal exchange rate.
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Under the asymmetric scenario, the standard deviations of wages, consumption, real net exports
and the nominal exchange rate are closer to the data than under the PCP or LCP scenarios. On the
other hand, the standard deviation of the terms of trade is too low, and net exports are procyclical
(instead of countercyclical, as in the data). The asymmetric scenario combines both PCP and LCP
so it shares some of the features of both, in particular, we can notice that the Frisch elasticity again
has a modest impact on the volatility and correlations of the open economy variables.
Taken together, the results of Tables 2, 4 and 5 show that the Frisch elasticity affects the
standard deviation of wages and inflation, but it does not have a significant effect on the moments
of the open economy variables.30 This finding is robust to the pricing assumption, and it implies
the existence of a disconnect between the response of wages and the open economy variables. The
relationship between the volatility of price changes (or the volatility of inflation) and the volatility
of the nominal exchange rate is weak under all three scenarios.
8 Conclusion
The challenge of building macroeconomic models that are consistent with the microeconometric
evidence has generated renewed interest on indivisible labour. However, indivisible labour is only
one type of nonconvexity affecting the labour supply. In models with sectors, such as many in-
ternational macro models, a nonconvexity arises whenever individuals cannot work in two or more
sectors at the same time.
It is fair to say that open economy macroeconomics has not been affected yet by the debate on
the microfoundations of aggregate labour supply. Perhaps the explanation is that a model with two
countries and two sectors is inherently larger than the closed economy, one sector models typically
analysed in the existing literature on nonconvexities in labour supply. Analytical tractability is
understandably a deciding factor.
This paper shows that it is possible to deal with the restriction that individuals cannot con-
temporaneously work in two sectors at the same time without sacrificing analytical tractability. To
simplify aggregation I use lotteries with complete markets. One drawback of this approach is that
30The exceptions are the correlation between real net exports and output under LCP, and the correlation between
the terms of trade and output under LCP under the asymmetric scenario (Tables 4 and 5). However, most moments
of the open economy variables are unaffected or only mildly affected by the Frisch elasticity.
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the elasticity of labour supply becomes infinite. This paper presents an analysis of the consequences
of varying the labour supply elasticity in open economy models.
One advantage of this approach is that the utility function features both the intensive (hours)
and the extensive (participation rates) margins of labour supply. Since individuals cannot work in
two sectors at the same time, exogenous shocks trigger a reallocation of workers between sectors,
which may be a costly or lengthy process. Therefore, it may be interesting to extend the model
by considering such costs or delays, and to analyse how the transmission of shocks or the Balassa-
Samuelson effect are affected by them. I leave these issues for future research.
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Table 1: Parameter values
Utility β = 0.99, σ = ε = 5, h0 = 0.24
Consumption indexes φ = 1, θ = 1, γ = 0.70, δ = 0.30
Asset market ν = 0.005
Firms ϕ = 0.75, η = 7.88, α = 0.8
ζ = ζ∗ = 1 (PCP)
Exogenous processes: bxt = x+ ρ · bxt−1 + t
Home money growth ρ = 0.4355, var() = (0.0093)2
Foreign money growth ρ = 0.3473, var() = (0.0081)2
Home tradeable technology ρ = 0.8263, var() = (0.0080)2
Foreign tradeable technology ρ = 0.8312, var() = (0.0098)2
Home nontradeable technology ρ = 0.8264, var() = (0.0035)2
Foreign nontradeable technology ρ = 0.5799, var() = (0.0047)2
Home government expenditure ρ = 0.6746, var() = (0.0012)2
Foreign government expenditure: ρ = 0.6449, var() = (0.0015)2
Cross-correlations corr(, 0):
corr(Home money growth, Home nontrad. tech.) = 0.3766
corr(Home money growth, Home gov. exp.) = 0.1853
corr(Home money growth, Foreign trad. tech.) = −0.3589
corr(Home money growth, Foreign gov. exp.) = −0.1608
corr(Home trad. tech., Foreign trad. tech.) = 0.3916
corr(Home nontrad. tech., Home gov. exp.) = 0.5746
corr(Home nontrad. tech., Foreign trad. tech.) = −0.2626
corr(Home gov. exp., Foreign trad. tech.) = −0.1945
corr(Foreign trad. tech., Foreign nontrad. tech.) = 0.4128
corr(Foreign nontrad. tech., Foreign gov. exp.) = −0.1817
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Table 2: Business cycle statistics
Standard deviationsa n WP C π NX RNX T RER e
U.S. data 1.41 4.08 0.77 0.33 0.33 0.28 1.77 4.86 4.78
Infinite elasticity 1.24 2.79 0.56 0.64 0.19 0.49 3.37 2.74 4.06
Frisch = 1.5 1.24 3.44 0.56 0.70 0.19 0.49 3.37 2.73 4.19
Frisch = 0.75 1.23 4.13 0.56 0.76 0.19 0.49 3.36 2.72 4.30
Autocorrelations n WP C π NX RNX T RER e
U.S. data 0.91 0.96 0.84 0.22 0.79 0.86 0.83 0.82 0.82
Infinite elasticity 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.38 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.72
Frisch = 1.5 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.40 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.71
Frisch = 0.75 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.40 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.72
Cross-correlations n, Y WP , Y C, Y π, Y NX, Y RNX,Y T, Y RER, Y e, Y
U.S. data 0.80 0.20 0.81 0.45 -0.50 -0.39 0.09 0.11 0.09
Infinite elasticity 0.80 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.82
Frisch = 1.5 0.79 0.95 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.80
Frisch = 0.75 0.77 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.78
Sectoral standard deviationsa
& cross-correlations Y TotTH YN π
Tot
TH πN nTH nN Y
Tot
TH , Y YN , Y nTH , Y nN , Y
U.S. data 1.99 0.40 0.66 0.35 1.57 0.71 0.90 0.49 0.82 0.74
Infinite elasticityb 1.40 0.86 0.55 0.51 2.37 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.69 0.73
Frisch = 1.5b 1.40 0.86 0.61 0.57 2.39 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.67 0.71
Frisch = 0.75b 1.40 0.86 0.67 0.62 2.42 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.66 0.69
NOTE: Data moments have been computed using quarterly series for the period 1980:1 to 2007:4 (but for wages the period is
1981:2 to 2005:4). Data sources and calculations are explained in the Appendix. All moments have been computed from logged
and H-P-filtered series, except NX and RNX , which are HP-filtered but not logged. The variables π, πTotTH and πN denote the
growth rates of P , PTotTH , and PN respectively.
a All standard deviations are relative to output (GDP).
b Sectoral wages are the same as aggregate wages in both models.
Table 3: Variance decompositions
Variables: n WP C RNX T RER e Y
Tot
TH YN nTH nN
Shocks:
H money growth 64.23 83.14 83.14 52.81 51.76 53.53 54.63 66.40 72.49 40.21 67.68
F money growth 6.10 0.50 0.50 33.54 32.23 34.85 36.31 12.03 2.4 7.72 3.01
H tradeable technology 12.92 0.91 0.91 1.11 2.03 0.34 0.23 11.84 1.19 36.65 1.47
F tradeable technology 8.79 4.93 4.93 6.29 7.98 4.52 3.72 4.07 8.12 11.56 5.09
H nontradeable technology 5.91 7.68 7.68 4.32 3.97 4.91 3.50 3.79 10.68 2.28 19.45
F nontradeable technology 0.45 0.33 0.33 0.39 0.54 0.25 0.22 0.29 0.39 0.59 0.29
H government expenditure 0.55 1.36 1.36 0.84 0.80 0.90 0.61 0.65 3.77 0.41 1.79
F government expenditure 1.06 1.15 1.15 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.77 0.92 0.96 0.57 1.24
NOTE: Shocks are orthogonalised using the Cholesky method, and the horizon is set at 200 quarters. Each column
reports, for each variable, the share of the total variance explained by every shock, measured in per cent. The
numbers are averages across all possible variance decompositions, given by the number of different orderings of the
8 shocks (40,320).
27
Table 4: LCP
Standard deviationsa n WP C π NX RNX T RER e
U.S. data 1.41 4.08 0.77 0.33 0.33 0.28 1.77 4.86 4.78
Infinite elasticity 1.42 4.80 0.96 0.87 0.36 0.11 4.26 5.19 6.53
Frisch = 1.5 1.40 5.41 0.96 0.93 0.36 0.12 4.41 5.25 6.66
Frisch = 0.75 1.38 6.05 0.97 0.98 0.37 0.13 4.55 5.29 6.77
Autocorrelations n WP C π NX RNX T RER e
U.S. data 0.91 0.96 0.84 0.22 0.79 0.86 0.83 0.82 0.82
Infinite elasticity 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.79 0.56 0.65 0.71
Frisch = 1.5 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.79 0.57 0.64 0.71
Frisch = 0.75 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.80 0.58 0.64 0.71
Cross-correlations n, Y WP , Y C, Y π, Y NX, Y RNX,Y T, Y RER, Y e, Y
U.S. data 0.80 0.20 0.81 0.45 -0.50 -0.39 0.09 0.11 0.09
Infinite elasticity 0.56 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.77 0.14 -0.68 0.77 0.71
Frisch = 1.5 0.53 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.76 0.09 -0.68 0.77 0.69
Frisch = 0.75 0.50 0.94 0.98 0.94 0.76 0.07 -0.66 0.77 0.67
Sectoral standard deviationsa
& cross-correlations Y TotTH YN π
Tot
TH πN nTH nN Y
Tot
TH , Y YN , Y nTH , Y nN , Y
U.S. data 1.99 0.40 0.66 0.35 1.57 0.71 0.90 0.49 0.82 0.74
Infinite elasticityb 0.87 1.15 1.82 0.81 2.79 1.37 0.82 0.98 0.27 0.59
Frisch = 1.5b 0.89 1.15 1.90 0.87 2.82 1.36 0.80 0.98 0.24 0.56
Frisch = 0.75b 0.90 1.15 1.96 0.93 2.84 1.34 0.79 0.98 0.22 0.54
NOTE: See Table 2.
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Table 5: PCP in exports and LCP in imports
Standard deviationsa n WP C π NX RNX T RER e
U.S. data 1.41 4.08 0.77 0.33 0.33 0.28 1.77 4.86 4.78
Infinite elasticity 1.29 3.63 0.73 0.63 0.25 0.30 0.82 3.58 4.86
Frisch = 1.5 1.27 4.28 0.73 0.69 0.25 0.29 0.80 3.60 5.00
Frisch = 0.75 1.26 4.97 0.73 0.75 0.25 0.29 0.81 3.62 5.12
Autocorrelations n WP C π NX RNX T RER e
U.S. data 0.91 0.96 0.84 0.22 0.79 0.86 0.83 0.82 0.82
Infinite elasticity 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.72 0.92 0.65 0.71
Frisch = 1.5 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.71 0.92 0.64 0.71
Frisch = 0.75 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.70 0.92 0.64 0.71
Cross-correlations n, Y WP , Y C, Y π, Y NX, Y RNX,Y T, Y RER, Y e, Y
U.S. data 0.80 0.20 0.81 0.45 -0.50 -0.39 0.09 0.11 0.09
Infinite elasticity 0.72 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.88 0.89 0.63 0.88 0.79
Frisch = 1.5 0.70 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.88 0.89 0.57 0.88 0.77
Frisch = 0.75 0.69 0.95 0.98 0.95 0.88 0.88 0.50 0.88 0.76
Sectoral standard deviationsa
& cross-correlations Y TotTH YN π
Tot
TH πN nTH nN Y
Tot
TH , Y YN , Y nTH , Y nN , Y
U.S. data 1.99 0.40 0.66 0.35 1.57 0.71 0.90 0.49 0.82 0.74
Infinite elasticityb 1.51 0.83 0.66 0.61 2.69 1.00 0.96 0.97 0.64 0.59
Frisch = 1.5b 1.52 0.83 0.72 0.67 2.72 0.99 0.96 0.97 0.62 0.56
Frisch = 0.75b 1.53 0.83 0.78 0.72 2.74 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.61 0.53
NOTE: See Table 2.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses of real net exports, terms of trade and real and nominal exchange rates to a 1% Home monetary shock 
 
Note: Time is in quarters.  
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Figure 2: Autocorrelations in the data and in the estimated models 
 
 
Note: Time is in quarters.  
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Figure 3: Impulse responses of real net exports, terms of trade and real and nominal exchange rates to a 1% Home tradeable 
technology shock 
 
Note: Time is in quarters.  
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
1 11 21 31 41
Infinite Frisch elasticity 
E
T
RER
NXQTY
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
1 11 21 31 41
Frisch = 0.75
E
T
RER
NXQTY
Figure 4: Impulse responses of real net exports, terms of trade and real and nominal exchange rates to a 1% Home nontradeable 
technology shock 
 
Note: Time is in quarters.  
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Figure 5: Impulse responses of real net exports, terms of trade and real and nominal exchange rates to a 1% Home government 
expenditure shock. 
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Appendices
Appendices are included to facilitate the task of the referees but they are not intended for publication.
However, I will make them available on request.
A.1 Data sources and calculations
Alias Description Sourcea
Dollar exchange rates IMF IFS
Exports of goods and services; Imports of goods and services OECD QNA
Exports deflator; Imports deflator OECD QNA
C Private final consumption expenditure OECD QNA
e Geometric GDP-weighted average of France, Germany, Canada,
Japan, Mexico and UK dollar exchange rates
n Aggregate weekly hours index, total private industries FRED
(quarterly averages of monthly data)
nTH Employees in manufacturing OECD MEI
nN Employees of service-providing industries BLS
(quarterly averages of monthly data)
NXQTY Exports - Imports of goods and services /GDP (chained volume estimates)
NX Exports - Imports of goods and services /GDP (current prices)
P Consumer Price Index for all items OECD MEI
P ∗ Geometric GDP-weighted average of Canada, France, Germany, OECD MEI
Japan, Mexico and UK CPI indexes
PTotTH Producer Price Index manufacturing industries OECD MEI
PN Consumer Price Index for services BLS
RER = eP ∗/P
T Exports deflator / Imports deflator
W Employment Cost Index, All workers BLS
WTH Employment Cost Index, Manufacturing BLS
WN Employment Cost Index, Service-producing industries BLS
Y Gross Domestic Product OECD QNA
Y TotTH Index of production in total manufacturing OECD MEI
YN Index of real Gross Domestic Product of services BEA NIPA
1
Shocks were estimated by fitting AR(1) processes to μ, μ∗, bzTH,t, bz∗TF,t, bzN,t, bz∗N,t, bG
and bG∗ (hats denote logs).
M1 (U.S., France, Germany, Japan), M2 (UK), M1+ (Canada), OECD MEI
M1a (Mexico) IMF IFS
G Government final consumption expenditure / consumption in the year 2000 OECD QNA
G∗ Geometric GDP-weighted average of France, Germany, Canada, Japan, OECD QNA
Mexico and UK real government final consumption expenditure
(divided by consumption in the year 2000)
μ growth rate of money
μ∗ arithmetic GDP-weighted average of Canada, France, Germany,
Japan, Mexico and UK money growth rates
n∗TF sum of manufacturing employees in Canada, France, Germany, Japan, OECD MEI
Mexico and UK ONS
n∗N sum of employees/employed in the service sector OECD MEI
in Canada, France, Germany, Japan and UK BLS
Eurostat
Y ∗TotTF arithmetic weighted average of index of production in total OECD MEI
manufacturing in Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico and UK
(weights given manufacturing value added in the year 2000, in dollars)
Y ∗N sum of service sector GDP of Canada, France, Germany, Japan and UK, OECD QNA
in dollars OECD MEIbzTH,t = bY TotTH − αbnTHbz∗TF,t = bY ∗TotTF − αbn∗TFbzN,t = bYN − αbnNbz∗N,t = bY ∗N − αbn∗N
a Legend: BEA NIPA = Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts;
BLS = Bureau of Labor Statistics; FRED = Federal Reserve Economic Data;
IMF IFS = IMF International Financial Statistics; OECD MEI = OECD Main Economic Indicators;
OECD QNA = OECD Quarterly National Accounts; ONS = Office for National Statistics, UK.
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A.2 Nonconvexity, heterogeneity and labor supply elasticity
In this Appendix I analyse whether the infinite labor supply elasticity in models with nonconvexities
is due to employment lotteries, or the homogeneity of preferences. Do employment lotteries always
result in an infinite labor supply elasticity? Or is the infinite elasticity due to the homogeneity
of individuals’ preferences? I will answer these questions first in the context of the indivisible
labor model (i.e. when individuals are not able to adjust the number of hours worked), since the
literature to date has focused on this type of nonconvexity. Then I will turn to the model presented
in this paper, in which I assume that individuals can adjust the number of hours worked, but their
commodity set is nonconvex because they cannot work in two sectors at the same time.
Some authors have shown that indivisible labor is not by itself a sufficient condition for the
aggregate labor supply to have infinite elasticity. This point is made, for example, by Christiano,
Trabandt and Walentin (2010), and is based on a model where individuals differ in their preference
for leisure (or aversion to work). By assumption the economy is populated by a continuum of
individuals, indexed with i ∈ [0, 1]. The utility of individual i is given by:
log (Ct)− iν , ν > 0 , (1)
if employed, and by:
log (Ct) , (2)
if unemployed.
Individuals are ranked according to their degree of aversion to work. Those with high i have a
strong aversion to work, and those with low i have a low aversion to work. If nt is employment,
then those with 0 ≤ i ≤ nt work and those with i > nt do not. Individuals either work some fixed
workweek or not at all.1 Everyone receives the same level of consumption. Aggregate utility is
given by:
Z 1
0
log (Ct) di−
Z nt
0
iν di = log (Ct)−
nν+1t
ν + 1
. (3)
1This assumption justifies why the amount of time spent at work does not affect the preference ordering.
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According to (3) the aggregate labor supply elasticity is equal to 1/ν, hence it is possible to have
a finite labor supply elasticity in an indivisible labor environment if individuals are heterogeneous.
Moreover any finite aggregate labor supply elasticity can be calibrated by making an assumption
on the cross-sectional distribution of skills or taste parameters.
However, Christiano, Trabandt andWalentin’s (2010) result depends on a particular aggregation
method, one which assumes that individuals are ranked according to their aversion to work, so that
only those with low aversion go to work, while others never go to work (as long as nt < 1). One
must find a justification for why individuals would spontaneously choose such arrangement, or
alternatively, one could justify the aggregation of preferences (3) by means of a social planner.
Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2010) assume instead a utilitarian household, which overrides
individual choices like a de facto social planner. Therefore Equation (3) is the social planner or
utilitarian household objective function, and the welfare-maximising equilibrium is the one in which
only those individuals with a low aversion to work are employed.2
Aggregate outcomes are different in an equilibrium with lotteries. In this set-up nt (i) is the
probability of being employed, and consistently with expected utility theory it enters the utility of
individual i linearly:
log [Ct (i)]− nt (i) · iν . (4)
The individual i’s choice of employment lottery must satisfy the following first-order condition:
1
Ct (i)
Wt
Pt
= iν , (5)
where Pt is the aggregate price index, and Wt is the market price of labor, assumed to be the same
for all individuals.3 Let the aggregate labor supply be defined as:
nt ≡
Z 1
0
nt (i) di . (6)
2The social planner solution also emerges in an economy where the individuals commit to a risk-sharing arrange-
ment. This solution concept is applied by Janko (2011), who assumes non-separability in consumption and leisure
and homogeneous preferences.
3This assumption helps to simplify the analysis but is not crucial.
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Equations (5) and (6) imply that the aggregate labor supply elasticity is infinite. Therefore,
heterogeneity per se does not guarantee a finite elasticity of labor supply, and much depends on
how the aggregate variables are derived from the preferences of heterogeneous individuals. With
indivisible labor and employment lotteries the elasticity of labor supply is infinite, even if agents
are heterogeneous.
Notice that this result depends on the assumption that individuals know their type i when they
solve the maximisation problem, and the alternative assumption that individuals do not know their
type would bring about a totally different result. In such alternative scenario, Equation (5) would
hold in expectation and everyone would choose the same Ct (i) and nt (i). Ex-post, after types are
revealed, an individual who is allowed to re-optimise while keeping the same Ct (i) would choose
nt (i) = 0. Again in this scenario individuals would not choose an equilibrium in which only those
with low i work.
I now turn to the model of Section 2 to further investigate the relationship between noncon-
vexity and the labor supply elasticity. Here nonconvexity arises because individuals cannot work
in two sectors at the same time. I modify the utility function by assuming that individuals are
heterogeneous in their preference for leisure, in a way similar to Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin
(2010), but I keep the same functional form as in Section 2. For the sake of simplicity, I consider
a one-period economy with flexible prices but without money, government expenditure and bonds,
but all the other assumptions remain unchanged.
The Home country is populated by a continuum of individuals i ∈ (0, 1] who differ in regard to
their preference for leisure. The utility function of individual i is given by:
C1−σ − 1
1− σ + υ (hTH , hN , i) , (7)
υ (hTH , hN , i) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
κ
ω (1− ψ − hTH)
ω iν if hTH 6= 0 ,
κ
ω (1− ψ − hN )
ω iν if hN 6= 0 ,
κ
ω (τ)
ω iν if hTH = hN = 0 ,
with ω, ν > 0.
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The utilitarian household problem
The household assigns a measure nTH of individuals to the tradeable goods sector and a measure nN
to the nontradeable goods sector. Those employed in the tradeable goods sector supply hTH hours
and those employed in the nontradeable goods sector supply hN hours of work. All individuals
working in a sector work the same hours, however both hTH and hN are choice variables. As in
Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2010) (and the literature on nonconvexity in labor supply) I
assume that the household gives everyone the same level of consumption.4 I assume that profits
from monopolistically competitive firms are distributed equally.
The utilitarian household allocates the individuals with the lowest i to the sector with the longer
workweek. For example, if τ ≥ 1 − ψ − hN ≥ 1 − ψ − hTH then the household’s objective is to
maximise:
max
C1−σ − 1
1− σ +
Z nTH
0
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hTH)ω iν di
+
Z nTH+nN
nTH
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hN)ω iν di+
Z 1
nTH+nN
κ
ω
(τ)ω iν di , (8)
subject to:
PC ≤ nTHWTHhTH + nNWNhN +
Z 1
0
ΠTH (fTH) dfTH +
Z 1
0
ΠN (fN ) dfN . (9)
The first-order conditions with respect to hours and participation rates are:
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hTH)ω nνTH +
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hN )ω (nTH + nN)ν
−κ
ω
(1− ψ − hN)ω nνTH −
κ
ω
(τ)ω (nTH + nN)
ν = −C
−σ
P
WTHhTH , (10)
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hN)ω (nTH + nN)ν −
κ
ω
(τ)ω (nTH + nN )
ν = −C
−σ
P
WNhN , (11)
4Thus the allocation of consumption is the same as in the equilibrium with lotteries which I will discuss later.
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κ (1− ψ − hTH)ω−1
(nTH)
ν+1
ν + 1
= −C
−σ
P
nTHWTH , (12)
κ (1− ψ − hN)ω−1
"
(nTH + nN)
ν+1
ν + 1
− (nTH)
ν+1
ν + 1
#
= −C
−σ
P
nNWN . (13)
Equations (10) to (13) show that in the utilitarian household solution participation rates do not
enter linearly the first-order conditions. Hence, it is possible to have a finite labor supply elasticity
in the model if individuals are heterogeneous. The parameter ν can be used to calibrate the labor
supply elasticity in a given parameterization.
Equilibrium with lotteries and insurance market
An individual chooses a probability nTH (i) of working in the tradeable sector and a probability
nN (i) of working in the nontradeable sector. A lottery is held to determine which individuals must
work and in which sector. Individuals are paid only for the work that they actually do, but have
access to an insurance market. Because there are two sources of income risk, the risk of being
unemployed and the risk of being allocated to the sector paying the lowest wage, one insurance
contract is not enough to attain full insurance. Therefore I assume that individuals buy two policies
with two separate insurance firms. Under policy 1 a premium is due if employed in sector TH, and
under policy 2 a premium is due if employed in sector N . Both policies pay out a compensation in
case of unemployment. I now show that this arrangement is sufficient to deliver full insurance.
The individual i chooses the compensation levels y1 (i) and y2 (i) by solving the following prob-
lem:
max nTH (i)
"
(C (i|TH))1−σ − 1
1− σ +
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hTH (i))ω iν
#
+nN (i)
"
(C (i|N))1−σ − 1
1− σ +
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hN (i))ω iν
#
+(1− nTH (i)− nN (i))
"
(C (i|U))1−σ − 1
1− σ +
κ
ω
(τ)ω iν
#
, (14)
subject to:
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PC (i|TH) ≤WTHhTH (i) +
Z 1
0
ΠTH (fTH) dfTH +
Z 1
0
ΠN (fN) dfN − p1 (i) y1 (i) , (15)
PC (i|N) ≤WNhN (i) +
Z 1
0
ΠTH (fTH) dfTH +
Z 1
0
ΠN (fN) dfN − p2 (i) y2 (i) , (16)
PC (i|U) ≤
Z 1
0
ΠTH (fTH) dfTH +
Z 1
0
ΠN (fN ) dfN + y1 (i) + y2 (i) , (17)
where C (i|TH), C (i|N) and C (i|U) are consumption of individual i contingent on working in
sectors TH, N or being unemployed, and p1 (i) and p2 (i) are the two insurance prices.
The first-order conditions with respect to y1 (i) and y2 (i) are:
nTH (i) (C (i|TH))−σ p1 (i) = (1− nTH (i)− nN (i)) (C (i|U))−σ , (18)
nN (i) (C (i|N))−σ p2 (i) = (1− nTH (i)− nN (i)) (C (i|U))−σ . (19)
Expected profits of both insurance firms are zero:
nTH (i) p1 (i) y1 (i)− (1− nTH (i)− nN (i)) y1 (i) = 0 , (20)
nN (i) p2 (i) y2 (i)− (1− nTH (i)− nN (i)) y2 (i) = 0 , (21)
therefore:
p1 (i) =
1− nTH (i)− nN (i)
nTH (i)
, (22)
p2 (i) =
1− nTH (i)− nN (i)
nN (i)
. (23)
Substituting (22) and (23) into the first-order conditions (18) and (19) we obtain:
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nTH (i) (C (i|TH))−σ 1− nTH (i)− nN (i)nTH (i) = (1− nTH (i)− nN (i)) (C (i|U))
−σ , (24)
nN (i) (C (i|N))−σ 1− nTH (i)− nN (i)nN (i) = (1− nTH (i)− nN (i)) (C (i|U))
−σ , (25)
which show that C (i|TH) = C (i|N) = C (i|U). Therefore, the individual insures herself fully
against income risk. Consumption of individual i, denoted by C (i) from now on, is independent of
the employment status. Moreover, since the left-hand sides of the constraints (15), (16) and (17)
are identical, y1 (i) and y2 (i) are chosen so that the right-hand sides are identical too. This implies
that income is equal to the expected wage given the lottery, regardless of the sector of employment:
PC (i) ≤ nTH (i)WTHhTH (i) + nN (i)WNhN (i) +
Z 1
0
ΠTH (fTH) dfTH +
Z 1
0
ΠN (fN) dfN . (26)
The optimal choice of hours hTH (i) and hN (i), and probabilities nTH (i) and nN (i) satisfies
the first-order conditions of the following problem:
max
C (i)1−σ − 1
1− σ + nTH (i)
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hTH (i))ω iν
+nN (i)
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hN (i))ω iν + (1− nTH (i)− nN (i))
κ
ω
(τ)ω iν , (27)
subject to (26). These first-order conditions are:
C (i)−σ
WTHhTH (i)
P
+
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hTH (i))ω iν −
κ
ω
(τ)ω iν = 0 , (28)
C (i)−σ
WNhN (i)
P
+
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hN (i))ω iν −
κ
ω
(τ)ω iν = 0 , (29)
C (i)−σ
nTH (i)WTH
P
− nTH (i)κ (1− ψ − hTH (i))ω−1 iν = 0 , (30)
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C (i)−σ
nN (i)WN
P
− nN (i)κ (1− ψ − hN (i))ω−1 iν = 0 , (31)
which in turn imply:
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hTH (i))ω + κ (1− ψ − hTH (i))ω−1 hTH (i) =
κ
ω
(τ)ω , (32)
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hN (i))ω + κ (1− ψ − hN (i))ω−1 hN (i) =
κ
ω
(τ)ω . (33)
Therefore, hTH (i) = hN (i) ≡ h for all i, and WTH = WN ≡ W. Consequently the four
first-order conditions reduce to just two:
C (i)−σ
W
P
h+
κ
ω
(1− ψ − h)ω iν − κ
ω
(τ)ω iν = 0 , (34)
C (i)−σ
W
P
− κ (1− ψ − h)ω−1 iν = 0 . (35)
Equations (34) and (35) imply that optimal hours are the same for each individual and do not
depend on WP . However, heterogeneous individuals choose different probabilities, therefore the law
of large numbers is not applicable.
Let us define n (i) ≡ nTH (i) + nN (i) and n ≡
R 1
0 n (i) di. It is easy to verify that the Frisch
elasticity of aggregate labor supply:
ϑ (nh)
ϑW/P
W/P
nh
=
ϑn
ϑW/P
W/P
n
,
is infinite. Therefore, similarly to the indivisible labor model, individual heterogeneity in itself does
not guarantee that the labor supply has finite elasticity. Whether or not this is the case depends
on the choice of equilibrium and how the aggregate variables are derived from the preferences of
heterogeneous individuals.
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A.3 Two-sector open economy version of Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988a)
The purpose of this Appendix is to show how the indivisible labor assumption of Hansen (1985)
and Rogerson (1988a) can be applied to a two-sector open economy model, and to explain why the
resulting labor supply is nonstandard.
Individuals can either work a fixed workweek h0, or not at all, but they can freely allocate
their fixed workweek between the tradeable and nontradeable sectors. They choose a probability
of being employed in each period (nt), and a lottery determines which individuals actually work.
Using the same notation and functional forms of Section 2, the individual maximization problem
can be written as follows:
max U0 = E0
∞X
t=0
βt
⎡
⎢⎣
C1−σt −1
1−σ +
χ
1−ε
³
Mt
Pt
´1−ε
+nt · κω (1− ψ − hTH,t − hN,t)ω + (1− nt) · κω (τ)ω
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
subject to
BtPT,t +
ν
C0
B2t PT,t +Mt ≤ (1 + rt−1)Bt−1PT,t +Mt−1
+TRt − PtCt + ntWt (hTH,t + hN,t)
+
Z 1
0
ΠTH,t (fTH) dfTH +
Z 1
0
ΠN,t (fN) dfN +Rt ,
hTH,t ≤ h0 .
In an interior solution with 0 < hTH,t < h0 the optimal choice of nt and hTH,t must satisfy the
following first-order conditions:
κ
ω
(1− ψ − hTH,t − hN,t)ω + C−σt
Wt
Pt
(hTH,t + hN,t) =
κ
ω
(τ)ω , (36)
nt · κ (1− ψ − hTH,t − hN,t)ω−1 = C−σt nt
Wt
Pt
, (37)
while hN,t is given by:
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hN,t = h0 − hTH,t . (38)
The labor supply is completely described by Equations (36) to (38). Notice that it is not possible
to solve for nt, hTH,t and hN,t. This becomes apparent after combining Equations (36) and (37)
and simplifying the resulting expression:
(1− ψ − hTH,t − hN,t)ω + ω (1− ψ − hTH,t − hN,t)ω−1 (hTH,t + hN,t) = (τ)ω . (39)
Sectoral hours hTH,t and hN,t are not identified because they are perfect substitutes. Equation
(39) does not provide sufficient information to solve for hTH,t and hN,t, but it enables us to calibrate
h0 using the preference parameters ψ, ω and τ :
(1− ψ − h0)ω + ω (1− ψ − h0)ω−1 h0 = (τ)ω .
After log-linearizing Equations (36) to (38) we obtain:
σ bCt = cWt − bPt ,
ω − 1
1− ψ − h0
hTH0bhTH,t + ω − 1
1− ψ − h0
hN0bhN,t − σ bCt + ³cWt − bPt´ = 0 ,
hTH0bhTH,t + hN0bhN,t = 0 .
The log-linearized system above simplifies to just two equations:
σ bCt = cWt − bPt , (40)
hTH0bhTH,t + hN0bhN,t = 0 . (41)
Since
ϑ(?Wt− ?Pt)
ϑ?nt = 0, the extensive labor supply elasticity
ϑnt
ϑWtPt
·
Wt
Pt
nt =
ϑ?nt
ϑ(?Wt− ?Pt)
is infinite.
In the system (40) and (41) there is no functional relationship linking hours to the wage rate:
12
sectoral hours are just a function of each other. As a result, both ϑ
?hTH,t
ϑ(?Wt− ?Pt)
and ϑ
?hN,t
ϑ(?Wt− ?Pt)
are not
defined, hence it is not possible to compute the intensive labor supply elasticities ϑhTH,t
ϑWtPt
·
Wt
Pt
hTH,t
and
ϑhN,t
ϑWtPt
·
Wt
Pt
hN,t
.
The labor supply is nonstandard, in the sense that we can only identify the elasticity with
respect to employment, but not with respect to hours worked in the two sectors.
The labor market equilibrium can be found by solving the supply and demand equations simul-
taneously. In the two-sector open economy version of Hansen and Rogerson the log-linearized labor
demand equations are:
bnt + bhTH,t = − 1αbzTH,t + 1αk1 bYTH,t + 1α (1− k1) bY ∗TH,t , (42)
bnt + bhN,t = − 1αbzN,t + 1α bYN,t . (43)
In the model in which labor cannot be supplied to both sectors simultaneously wages are equal-
ized between sectors and hours worked are constant, therefore the labor supply equation is (40).
The labor demand equations are:
bnTH,t = − 1αbzTH,t + 1αk1bYTH,t + 1α (1− k1) bY ∗TH,t , (44)
bnN,t = − 1αbzN,t + 1α bYN,t . (45)
In the two-sector open economy version of Hansen and Rogerson the labor market equilibrium
is the solution to the simultaneous equations system (42), (43), (40) and (41), whereas in the model
in which labor cannot be supplied to both sectors simultaneously the labor market equilibrium is
the solution to (44), (45) and (40). Therefore, the two models have the same log-linearized solution:
in the two-sector open economy version of Hansen and Rogerson aggregate hours worked in the two
sectors are measured by nthTH,t and nthN,t, and in the model in which labor cannot be supplied
to both sectors simultaneously they are measured by nTH,t and nN,t.
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